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 [ABSTRACT What does it mean to empower people through the housing in which they 
live, and how is this empowerment to be achieved? These are the questions which are 
examined in this paper. Typologies of empowerment processes are devised in an attempt 
to make sense of the conceptual and empirical variety involved. The distinction between 
‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ empowerment orientations is argued to be particularly 
important for understanding the content, pattern and general direction of empowerment 
processes. Empowerments through knowledge, statute, resources, agreement and speci® c 
power transfer are then discussed in relation to speci® c housing contexts, in particular 
the context of social housing management. The utility of the typologies of empowerment 
processes is tested in application to speci® c tenant participation arrangements. It is 
concluded that resident empowerment is worth pursuing not only for its own sake, but 
for the bene® ts which it can bring to a wider society. 
 
The Meaning of Empowerment 
The concept of power has been strongly contested since Lukes (1974). As an 
abstract general concept, it has suffered from a high degree of vagueness and 
ambiguity, which has severely limited its theoretical utility (Barnes, 1988; Clegg, 
1989). As a practical concept, however, it remains extremely popular, because of 
its emotive content, and consequently plays a major role in political debate and 
policy making. 
The concept of empowerment is generally intended in the more practical 
sense, as involving a process by which people who are disadvantaged or 
excluded acquire something of the character of citizens (Harrison, 1995, p. 22). 
At the same time, however, the concept of empowerment retains a necessary 
element of vagueness, associated with the abstract general meaning of power, 
from which it is derived. 
It is possible, therefore, that the concept of empowerment is not amenable 
to a precise general definition. Provisionally, however, it is suggested that 
empowerment could be described as any process by which people’s control over 
their lives is increased. The exact meaning of increasing control can then be 
spelled out only in specific contexts such as employment, housing or education, 
although the general theme in each of these contexts will be one of increasing 
choice and freedom of action for the people affected. 
 
Empowerment in a Housing Context 
This paper is concerned speci® cally with housing-related empowerment, and 
this can be defined as any process by which people gain increased control over 
their housing situation. Such control can be individual or collective, over 
production or consumption, over investment or management. The paper is 
concerned mainly with collective control over housing consumption and management, 
but this should not be taken to imply any collectivist, consumptionist or 
managerial bias in the treatment of housing empowerment. It should also be 
noted from the outset that it may not be possible to draw any precise distinction 
between a process which gives people more control over their housing and one 
which gives them more control over their residential environment (encompassing 
roads, schools, shops, parks, leisure centres, and so on, and including the 
regulation of behaviour within that environment). 
The paper starts by distinguishing empowerment from participation, and 
makes a number of comments relating to the recent literature on tenant participation 
in particular. It is argued that there is a need for a more rigorous examination 
of empowerment processes, and in the following section an attempt is made to 
devise a typology of such processes which is completely different from any 
typology of tenant participation processes. This typology is then applied in the 
following sector to important recent developments in Britain which have 
involved, or have been claimed to involve, the empowerment of residents. 
Specific means of empowerment which are considered include the provision of 
information, the passing of legislation, the commitment of resources, and the 
transfer of management functions. The ® nal section of the paper then brie¯ y 
discusses the implications of the arguments on empowerment for the development 
of communities and the changing role of housing management. 
As Harrison (1995, p. 22) points out, ‘‘empowerment clearly means more 
than . . . participation’’, but it may be worth considering just how much more 
empowerment does involve. People may participate individually or collectively 
in an activity without thereby experiencing any increase in their control over 
their lives. This can happen if those who control that activity simply want to 
use the participation for their own ends. For example, they may want to make 
themselves better informed on a subject of which the participants have special 
knowledge, or they may merely want to go through the motions of participation 
without taking seriously the participants’ contributions. They may want to 
promote an image of themselves as ‘‘listening to the people’’ but without any 
real commitment to the empowerment of those people. Participation without 
empowerment is therefore a confidence trick performed by the controllers of an 
activity on participants in that activity. To the extent to which the trick works, 
it must be disempowering rather than empowering. Those who take this cynical 
approach, however, should bear in mind the arguments of Foucault (1980), to 
the effect that simply entering into discussion about what can or cannot be done 
is itself an empowering process, so that those who initiate participation, even 
with disempowering intent, may ® nd themselves forced or influenced to act in 
ways which they had not originally intended. 
Bearing in mind the above caveat, there is in fact a good deal of overlap 
between participation and empowerment. For example, mechanisms for consultation 
clearly involve the participation of those consulted, but the participants 
are also empowered to the extent to which attention is paid to their views and 
concerns. This argument is obviously stronger with regard to the forms of 
participation where participants can hold decision makers to account for what 
they do and where participants have some say in the decision making process 
itself. In these cases, the specificity of participation is practically de® ned by the 
nature of the empowerment which it creates. 
It is not the purpose of this paper to conduct a detailed review of the literature 
on empowerment and resident control. However, it may be worth repeating 
some of the main findings of that literature. Various researchers over the years 
have concluded that resident-controlled housing is both more efficient (Turner, 
1982, p. 109) and more effective (Ward, 1976), but this has not been generally 
recognised by housing organisations and housing professionals until relatively 
recently. This could be in part because most of the literature is concerned with 
housing provision rather than housing use or management (which is the focus 
of this paper), a bias which is ironically even more pronounced in more recent 
writings (Mathe´y, 1992). It should be noted only in passing, therefore, that 
there is a growing literature on empowerment more generally (that is, beyond 
housing), and this literature tends to concentrate on issues of individual psychology 
rather than collective action, although it is recognised that there is a 
reciprocal relationship between psychological empowerment and community 
involvement and participation (Zimmerman & Rappaport, 1988). On the whole, 
with one or two notable exceptions (for example, Cairncross et al., 1994), the 
debate has not really gone beyond a consideration of what Harrison (1995) calls 
‘‘therapeutic strategies’’ (p. 23), that is professional, or possibly self-help, practices 
directed at improving the quality of life for disadvantaged citizens. 
Cairncross et al. (1994) posed the question directly of whether tenant participation 
empowered the tenants concerned, and their answer was that ‘‘it all 
depends’’ (p. 198). Basically, there were two types of strategy for empowering 
themselves which participating tenants could deploy: working within the rules 
of the game set by their landlord, or contesting those rules by questioning the 
landlord’s definition of permissible participation and creating new points at 
which landlord and tenants could formally interact (Cairncross et al., 1994, p. 180) 
(such points were held by Clegg, 1989, to be particularly significant for power 
relations). Tenants’ groups who followed the latter type of strategy, however, 
were likely to have their legitimacy questioned by their landlord who would 
then use this to justify their marginalisation and exclusion (Cairncross et al., 
1994, p. 190). Fortunately for tenant empowerment, then, the structure and 
processes of tenant participation offer a rich variety of opportunities for tenants 
to gain advantage even while ostensibly playing by the landlord’s rules. 
I have discussed certain aspects of the relation between tenant participation 
and empowerment elsewhere (Somerville & Steele, 1995a). There it was argued 
that increasing participation alone cannot achieve the lasting empowerment of 
the participants. What is needed in addition are institutional arrangements for 
informing, training and educating those participants, and for securing a permanent 
shift in the balance of power from landlord to tenants. The paper suggested 
that tenant empowerment is only one of three criteria by which tenant participation 
can be assessed (the others being effectiveness and representativeness), and 
three different types of institutional arrangement for tenant participation were 
outlined, namely internal markets, tenant-led management, and landlord-tenant 
partnerships. It was concluded that tenant empowerment was potentially lowest 
under internal market arrangements (although still higher than under many 
current bureaucratic arrangements), and highest under systems of tenant control; 
landlord-tenant partnerships, such as those based on estate agreements (Steele 
et al., 1995), tended to be more empowering of tenants than internal markets, 
but obviously less empowering than full tenant control. Arrangements which 
are potentially more empowering for tenants, however, may have disadvantages 
in other respects. For example, they may incur burdens of responsibility, or 
they may empower only a minority of tenants who may not be suf® ciently 
representative of the tenants as a whole or who may lack the necessary skills or 
commitment. The key goal for empowerment is that people should be in a 
position where they can freely choose the type of participation arrangement into 
which they wish to enter, and what they need to achieve this is ‘‘the right blend 
of external support, democratic selection and civic education’’ (Somerville & 
Steele, 1995a, p. 278). This paper explores a little of what is involved in such a 
blend. 
Stewart & Taylor (1995) have recently made an important contribution to the 
literature on empowerment in a housing context. They argue that empowerment 
can be understood in terms of four ‘dimensions’ (which have nothing in common 
with those of Lukes, 1974): process, degree, focus and ownership (Stewart & 
Taylor, 1995, p. 13). The basis for this typology, however, is not explained or 
justified, and therefore alternative typologies are possible. They also argue that 
‘‘empowerment has to be seen as a cycle’’ (p. 18), and in their conclusion they 
describe what they call ‘‘a cycle of disempowerment’’ (p. 66), according to which 
disempowerment  flows through structures of exclusion, isolation, dependency 
and marginalisation. The ontological status of these structures (or ‘levels’, as 
they call them), however, is not clear. They may perhaps be processes, but if 
they are really structures we need to know what sort of structures they are, how 
they bring about the effects they do, how they relate to the dimensions outlined 
at the beginning, and how they ® t in with the theoretical literature on power 
(Lukes, Clegg, etc). For these reasons, it would appear that Stewart & Taylor ’s 
analysis needs to be developed further and with greater rigour, and this task is 
attempted in the next section. 
Finally, empowerment needs to be distinguished from sustainable development, 
with which it overlaps (Dwelly, 1996; Fordham, 1995). Essentially, sustainability 
is about ensuring that the consumption of resources by the current 
generation does not occur at the expense of the next generation. It can be argued 
that those living in an area are those who are most concerned for the future of 
the children in that area. If this is correct, then it follows that the empowerment 
of residents in that area will be most conducive to its sustainable development, 
and that improvements in the area, including such things as resident participation, 
are unlikely to be sustainable without such empowerment. 
Typologies of Empowerment Processes 
If we think of empowerment primarily as a process, then it is possible to classify 
such processes in a number of different ways. A useful starting point here is 
Stewart & Taylor ’s two-dimensional model of empowerment processes, which is 
reproduced in Figure 1 (Stewart & Taylor, 1995, p. 15). Essentially, this model 
interprets empowerment in terms of the strategic options available to individuals 
or groups of people in dealing with powerful organisations. The ® rst dimension 
of the model indicates that people can exercise active options such as voice and 
exit, or passive options such as loyalty or alienation. The second dimension, by 
contrast, sets out options as either constructive, like voice or loyalty, or destructive, 
like exit or alienation. 
Figure 1. Process of empowerment. Note: Individual responses are shown in the 
diamond; collective responses are shown outside the diamond. Source: Stewart 
& Taylor (1995). 
This is an interesting model, but it has its problems. It is difficult to see, for 
example, how alienation can be represented as a process of empowerment: 
rather, it looks like disempowerment. This thought then raises the question of 
what exactly is the nature of the empowerment involved in each strategic option. 
For the exit option, for example, it could be argued that empowerment results 
not so much from the actual exercise of the option as from being given the 
power so to do it. This is because the reality of exit could be destructive and 
therefore disempowering for the people who follow this route, whereas the 
potential to exit can in some situations be used as a weapon to achieve 
improvements in their living or working conditions. Again, in the case of the 
loyalty option, it is difficult to see how such a passive strategy can involve 
empowerment, but on the other hand it is not necessarily disempowering either: 
it all depends on the nature of the relationship with the organisation to which 
loyalty is being pledged. Finally, even the exercise of the voice option is not a 
straightforward empowering process, because, as mentioned in the previous 
section, participation in itself does not necessarily change anything (Foucault 
notwithstanding). The link between the model and the reality of empowerment 
processes therefore appears tenuous. 
Table 1. A classification of empowerment processes 
Classificatory criteria Empowerment process 
I Direction of action Top-down Bottom-up 
II Dependency effect Increasing dependence Increasing independence 
III Institutional change Conservative Radical Reformist 
IV Beneficiaries Individuals Collectives Elites 
In order to develop improved typologies of empowerment processes, it is 
necessary to look behind the model of voice/exit/loyalty/alienation and consider 
how the people-organisation relation is structured and how it is changing 
through time. Such a consideration suggests that empowerment processes can 
be classified according to the source of empowerment activity (those with power 
or those without power), the change in dependency relations between the two 
parties (increased dependence or increased independence), and the general effect 
on the organisations and institutions involved (conserving, restructuring or 
fragmenting). Stewart & Taylor ’s model applies only to the last of these classificatory criteria, and even then only 
in a modified form. In addition, the concerns 
which Stewart & Taylor have with the focus and ownership of empowerment 
could be covered by means of a classification in terms of the population which 
is the recipient or beneficiary of the empowerment flows (in general terms, 
selected individuals or groups of people, in a variety of roles) (see Table 1). 
In the case of the first classification criterion, namely that of the source of 
empowerment, the process of empowerment can either originate from those who 
have the power and move towards those who are to be empowered, or it can 
start with those seeking to be empowered and move towards those who already 
have the power. Empowerment processes of the former orientation can be 
described as moving in a ‘top-down’ direction, while those of the latter orientation 
can be labelled as ‘bottom-up’ processes. This is an important distinction, 
which has been prefigured in Turner ’s (1990) distinction between citizenship 
developed from above (so-called ‘passive’ citizenship) and that developed from 
below (‘active’ citizenship). In practice, it is often assumed that empowerment 
is led from the top, as in so-called ‘top-down’ approaches to the analysis of 
policy implementation (Sabatier, 1986). In the case of Stewart & Taylor (1995), 
however, as pointed out above, empowerment is characterised in terms of 
fundamental strategic choices made at the ‘bottom’ (although such choices are 
perhaps enabled and shaped by decisions made at the ‘top’?). 
Second, power can flow in such a way as either to increase the independence 
of those affected, or to make them more dependent on others, or to leave 
dependency relations more or less unchanged. There is a tendency to assume 
that empowerment must involve increasing independence, but this is not the case 
(for example, partnerships between organisations will increase their dependence 
upon each other but may also at the same time widen their overall sphere of 
action and influence). The assumption arises because empowerment is identified 
with enabling while dependence is commonly (and wrongly) associated with 
impairment, and impairment is in turn assumed to be disempowering (which it 
often is but does not have to be). The reality is that we are all interdependent, but 
some are more interdependent than others, and the degree of interdependence is 
not necessarily related to the capacity for reciprocity (which is a function of the 
power that can be exercised in the context of interdependence). This point is 
explained further below. 
Third, there is an issue concerning whether empowerment involves deregulation 
or improved regulation. Both can be liberating, but in quite different ways. 
For example, for housing tenants, the goal could be that of freedom from 
landlords (which would of course mean the end of rented housing), expressed 
through exercise of the exit option, or it could be a more equal partnership with 
their landlord and with landlords generally (involving mutual dependency), 
achieved through the voice option. Alternatively, tenants may not seek to change 
their power relation with their landlord at all, but only to receive better services 
from that landlord, which may have the effect of empowering them in other 
ways (for example, an improved repairs service may save the tenant time and 
trouble which can then be devoted to more productive activities). Such tenants, 
whether they know it or not, are exercising the loyalty option. All three goals 
therefore involve empowerment, but the institutional outcomes are completely 
different. Empowerment processes can therefore be characterised as ‘conservative’, 
in the sense that they tend to conserve, and possibly enhance and expand, 
existing institutional structures, or ‘radical’, in the sense that they tend to 
break up existing institutional structures and create separate new power bases, 
untrammelled by the old systems of regulation, or they could be ‘egalitarian’ or 
‘reformist’, in the sense that they tend to reform existing institutions into 
structures within which power is more equally distributed. In the case of radical 
empowerment, if the new power bases were actually to supplant the old ones, 
the effect could be described as ‘revolutionary’ change. 
The distinction between ‘conservative’, ‘reformist’ and ‘radical’ empowerment 
cuts across the other two distinctions, between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ 
empowerment orientations and between increasing and decreasing dependency 
effects. For example, the right to manage conferred on council tenants by the 
Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 is a ‘radical’ 
empowerment measure because it enables tenants to free themselves from local 
authority managerial control, and it is ‘top-down’ empowerment because the 
initiative was driven entirely by central government with little support or even 
interest from tenants themselves. As for dependency effects, it might seem that 
the exercise of the right to manage by a tenants’ group would increase the 
independence of that group because it would no longer have to rely on the local 
authority. In practice, however, the independence of the new tenant management 
organisation could prove illusory, as it would continue to be dependent on other 
organisations, especially for funding, and these organisations would include, 
inevitably, the local authority itself. 
A final way to classify empowerment processes is in terms of the intended or 
actual recipients or beneficiaries of empowerment flows, and in particular 
whether they empower separate individual persons and elites, or broad collectivities 
and the mass of people generally. This is primarily an issue of the ownership 
of the empowerment which takes place, although in practice ownership is 
inseparable from the specific content of the empowering mechanisms (which 
Stewart & Taylor call the ‘focus’ of empowerment—Stewart & Taylor, 1995, 
p. 17). An estate agreement, for example, could be jointly owned by the 
collectivity of estate residents and estate office staff, and this joint ownership 
would be inextricable from the specific focus of the agreement on standards for 
housing service delivery and priorities for dealing with the estate’s problems. 
On the other hand, however, the agreement might be seen as being owned by 
the housing organisation or its intermediaries, with the result that the agreement 
differs little from an orthodox individual tenancy agreement (Steele et al., 1995). 
Alternatively, it is possible that the agreement might be seen as owned by an 
elite group of tenants, so that the focus of the agreement is partial and insufficiently inclusive. 
There are some rights, such as the Right to Buy, whose exercise leads to the 
empowerment only of individuals. In terms of the distinctions drawn above, the 
Right to Buy is a ‘top-down’ ‘radical’ policy which creates independence to 
the extent that the purchasers become responsible for the maintenance and 
management, and possible improvement, of their own home, and are no longer 
dependent on a landlord for the provision of such services. The ‘radical’ nature 
of the policy can be clearly grasped from the fact that the Right to Buy is a right 
not just to exit from landlord control but to take one’s residence with one, 
thereby undermining, if only slightly, the landlord’s asset base. 
Empowerment processes can be further distinguished according to their spatial 
focus or level of operation, for example empowerment at the level of a neighbourhood 
or housing estate, empowerment at the level of a local authority area, or 
empowerment at a national level. In practice, however, these different levels are 
intertwined in complex ways, and some illustrations of this are discussed below. 
Discussion of empowerment has in recent years been unnecessarily complicated 
by the introduction of terms such as ‘social exclusion’ and ‘underclass’. As 
Room has pointed out, notions of social exclusion derive from conservative 
types of welfare regime (Room, 1995, p. 106), and indeed strategies of social 
inclusion can be identified with the conservative processes of empowerment 
referred to above. In contrast, strategies for equality in power and resources 
which derive from social democratic welfare regimes can be identified with 
reformist or egalitarian empowerment processes. Interestingly, the classification 
in Table 1 differs from Room’s only with regard to so-called ‘radical’ empowerment 
processes. Whereas Room sees only a minor redistribution of resources in 
order to enable the poor to compete in the market (deriving from so-called 
liberal welfare regimes), this paper suggests strategies of increasing choice which 
may have either reactionary or revolutionary effects depending upon the context 
in which such choice is exercised. This argument indicates that the notion of a 
liberal welfare regime is too simplistic. In addition, the argument about social 
exclusion casts doubt on the meaning of exclusion as a ‘level of disempowerment’ 
as stated by Stewart & Taylor (1995, p. 64), except perhaps as a means of 
justifying an essentially conservative strategy of social inclusion. The very 
concept of a cycle of disempowerment has to be treated with caution, because it 
is inextricably tied to what is ultimately a conservative political programme. 
Some Applications of Empowerment Typologies 
So far, the argument has been conducted at a fairly abstract level. The typologies 
developed above now need to be tested in relation to real housing policy 
processes. This paper concentrates primarily on issues of tenant participation. 
Ultimately, the aim is to show how an empowerment-focused approach can 
provide a means for the evaluation of housing and housing-related policy which 
will be of bene® t to all. 
Provisionally, for the purposes of evaluation, ‘top-down’ processes of 
empowerment can be analysed under four headings: (1) the communication of 
appropriate information, training and education; (2) the conferral of specific 
individual and collective rights; (3) the provision of appropriate financial and 
other resources; and (4) the transfer or recognition of specific powers of negotiation, 
decision-making and monitoring. Similarly, ‘bottom-up’ processes of 
empowerment fall into four main types: (1) increasing informal and formal 
participation in collective activity; (2) increasing exercise of rights conferred 
through ‘top-down’ processes; (3) increasing assertiveness in access to resources 
required for participation and for the exercise of conferred rights; and (4) 
increasing pressure for participation in decision-making processes. In this section, 
some examples are considered of these types of empowerment processes. It 
should be noted that in each case what is occurring is a specific flow of power 
or influence to tenants, either as individuals or as members of specific groups 
(or in specific official positions) or as tenants in general. The main difference 
between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ processes is simply that in the former case 
the flow of power is initiated by the landlord, while in the latter case it is 
activated by the tenants. It is important to realise that this does not mean in 
either case that the power is actually ¯ owing from the landlord, although this 
may well be happening in some situations (for example, with regard to the 
resourcing of tenants’ organisations). Instead, it could be the result of growing 
co-operation and understanding between landlord and tenant, which work to 
the bene® t of both parties: mutual growth enhances the power of the partnership 
between them, and thereby increases their power both jointly and separately. 
In this section, each of the provisional headings for ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ 
actions is used as means for structuring the discussion of resident empowerment 
processes. The classification of methods of empowerment under the various 
headings (knowledge acquisition, statute, resourcing, agreement and power 
transfer) is for convenience only, and is not intended to have any theoretical 
significance. The material discussed under each heading is then evaluated by 
reference to the typologies outlined in the previous section, and conclusions 
drawn wherever appropriate. As has been noted by Sabatier (1986) and others, 
‘top-down’ processes tend to predominate over ‘bottom-up ones, but this is no 
more than one would expect in ‘normal’ (that is, non-revolutionary) situations. 
Empowerment through Knowledge 
Considering the eight headings listed above, the first issue concerns what is to 
count as appropriate information for the purposes of empowerment. ‘Knowledge 
is power’, so the cliche goes, but in reality much depends upon the nature of the 
knowledge and how it is communicated. For example, owner occupiers may 
enjoy property rights over their home which empower them to a significant 
degree, but they may lack reliable information about the operation of the housing 
market and the practices of mortgage lenders, and this can leave them to some 
extent at the mercy of the housing market professionals and of the housing market 
itself (ending up, if unlucky, with negative equity and unsellable property). This 
of course is a universal feature of markets, namely that they are unpredictable, 
so it can be concluded straightaway that markets are disempowering to the extent 
that information about how they operate is never adequate. For many, perhaps 
most, owner occupiers, however, this disempowering quality of markets is 
obscured by the fact that for most of the time they are not thinking about moving 
home and are therefore not actively participating in the business of house 
purchase and sale. 
For tenants, the situation is quite different. What they need most of all is 
information about the landlord’s policies and practices, and explanations and 
justifications of these. They need regular and detailed information on what is 
happening in their home area, including reports on the performance of landlord’s 
representatives and agents in the area. For secure tenants of local authorities and 
housing associations, empowerment through the provision of such appropriate 
information has been stimulated by legislation. For example, the Housing Act 
1980 conferred on them rights to be informed about their landlord’s allocation 
policy and to be consulted about proposed changes in management practice 
(except on rent levels). Later on, the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 
section 167 required local authorities to report annually to their tenants in order 
to win approval for their schemes (for example under Estate Action, DoE, 
1993). By various means, therefore, central government has contributed to the 
empowerment of social housing tenants through greater provision of appropriate 
information. 
The contribution from landlords themselves has been more mixed. With regard 
to allocation policy, for example, a survey for the Chartered Institute of Housing 
found that typically local authorities had bureaucratic allocations systems which 
were geared more towards administrative convenience than assisting customers 
(Karn & Stafford, 1990). In general, authorities did not attempt to explain or 
justify the policies which they had. With regard to information about management 
performance, there is no evidence that any authority supplied such 
information on a regular basis to all its tenants before the 1989 Act. Since 
1990, however, some authorities have been stimulated to go well beyond their 
minimum statutory duties and provide a high quality of information which is 
of potential value to their tenants (Marsh et al., 1993). The decentralisation of 
housing services in many authorities from 1980 onwards has also often been 
associated with an improvement in the quality of communications with tenants 
(Mainwaring, 1988), although it is still generally the case that information 
available to tenants at estate level (as distinct from borough-wide information) 
is rarely adequate (Cairncross et al., 1989; Marsh et al., 1993). Overall, therefore, 
empowerment of residents through provision of appropriate information has 
not been an outstanding feature of local authority approaches (or of housing 
association approaches, for that matter), except when prodded into action by 
central government (or the Housing Corporation). The reasons for this have not 
been investigated, but it could be because of the inevitable costs involved in 
gathering and circulating such information and because of a desire on the part 
of local politicians and professionals to monopolise such information in order to 
protect their power. 
Another aspect to the issue of empowerment through knowledge is the 
provision of training and education for tenants to perform specific roles and 
undertake new types of activity. The communication of information to tenants 
on its own is not likely to empower them to a significant degree. As Day & Klein 
(1987) have noted, consumers do not generally use information about producer 
performance to press for changes in that performance or to influence practice in 
such a way as to increase consumer control. One reason for this could be that 
they lack the skills and understanding required to apply such information in the 
pursuit of their own empowerment. In recent years, official recognition of this 
‘skills gap’ has led to the creation of a number of organisations, such as the 
Tenant Participation Advisory Service (TPAS), whose concern is, among other 
things, to encourage tenant empowerment by means of appropriate education 
and training. It has also led to the provision of special courses for tenants 
and tenant participation officers such as the Chartered Institute of Housing’s 
Certificate in Tenant Participation. The government’s own attitude to such tenant 
training, however, has been criticised as paternalistic and personalistic (Furbey 
et al., 1996), and this criticism raises an important issue about the nature of the 
knowledge and skills which tenants need in order to secure more effective 
control of their homes and their estates, rather than becoming simply more 
responsible and more respectable tenants. At this stage, one can perhaps only 
make a few tentative suggestions. For example, tenants may need training in 
how to budget at the estate level, they may need to understand better how the 
housing organisation works, they may need practice in organising themselves 
more effectively, they may need space and time to explore different possible 
options and opportunities for empowerment. Above all, tenants need encouragement 
and support in identifying their own training and education needs, so that 
they can set the agenda for themselves rather than following one already set by 
landlords or by government. As Baistow (1994/95, p. 37) has pointed out, the 
identification of one’s own needs is an important part of the process of becoming 
empowered. 
Returning to the typologies outlined earlier, it could be argued firstly that the 
limitations in empowerment from the communication of information by landlords 
and governments arise mainly from its ‘top-down’ character. As Symon & 
Walker (1994) have pointed out, tenants may respond to such communications, 
but they are unlikely to be in a position to act upon them. Even if they have the 
necessary skills for action, they may choose not to do so, for various reasons (for 
example, they may calculate that the perceived costs of action outweigh the 
perceived benefits). Second, increased communication, even if the flow is only 
one-way, involves increased interaction, and therefore tends to result in increased 
interdependence. In this case, landlord and tenants in time will come to rely 
more on each other. On the other hand, however, if tenants choose to develop 
skills which enable them to manage for themselves (as part of a ‘bottom-up’ 
empowerment process), it is possible that at least some of them might grow to 
become less dependent on their landlord. In all, therefore, there are three possible 
courses which the process of empowerment could follow: passive absorption 
and acceptance of the knowledge supplied by their landlord and others; greater 
interaction leading to closer co-operation and mutual dependence between 
landlord and tenant; and greater independence and freedom of action leading to 
movement away from their landlord by individual tenants and tenant groups. 
In other words, tenants can choose options of loyalty, voice or exit, leading to 
‘conservative’, ‘reformist’ or ‘radical’ outcomes. In this case, however, it should 
be pointed out that the reformist outcomes are not necessarily egalitarian. 
Increasing interdependence can occur within a paternalistic framework where 
the education and training of tenants serves to incorporate powerful tenants and 
tenant groups more effectively within the landlord’s power structures. Such a 
situation is more accurately characterised as ‘conservative reform’. 
There is finally the issue of which tenants are empowered through the receipt 
of information, education and training. It seems likely that there will always be 
significant inequalities among tenants in how well they are informed on a range 
of matters affecting their everyday lives. Specific training courses for tenants 
could have the effect of cultivating elites who could dominate the selection of 
different collective tenant strategies. On the other hand, however, if such tenants 
remain in close contact with their grass roots, they could act as catalysts for the 
diffusion of a more universal and democratic tenant education. 
Empowerment through Statute 
Conferring rights on residents through legislation is potentially much more 
effective for empowerment purposes than the provision of information or 
education. The force of civil law is a uniquely strong institutional support for 
those seeking greater control over their lives. Owner occupiers already enjoy 
property rights which traditionally have been jealously guarded by the English 
legal system, although eroded to some extent by public health and planning 
legislation. At the present time, apart from certain relaxations of planning 
restrictions, there are no ‘top-down’ processes in motion which might involve 
an extension or enhancement of the existing rights of owner occupiers, let alone 
the conferral of new ones. Possible candidates for such new rights include rights 
for protection of the home owner ’s equity, a right to sell (for example to a local 
authority), and rights to a safe and pollution-free environment. The adoption of 
such rights could be considerably empowering for poorer home owners in 
particular. Under its current legislative proposals, however, the government is 
planning to abolish mandatory house renovation grants, which effectively gave 
owner occupiers a right to have their homes made ® t for their habitation. Current 
trends, therefore, under the guise of ‘deregulation’ are moving in the direction 
of the disempowering of owner occupiers. 
For tenants, who lack the property rights of owner occupiers, a complex array 
of rights has developed over the years. From 1915 onwards, private tenants had 
their rents protected by law against increases (so-called ‘controlled rents’), but 
interestingly this has always been seen as a disempowering of private landlords 
rather than an empowering of private tenants. The lower rents which resulted 
from such protection may have allowed private tenants to gain greater control 
over other aspects of their lives (because they had more money to spend on 
other things), but it did not necessarily give them any greater control over their 
housing (for example, it may have made it more difficult for them to get the 
landlord to carry out repairs). Moreover, the introduction of controlled rents 
created an incentive to landlords to evict old tenants in favour of new tenants 
who would pay higher rents, so the government had to provide a measure of 
security of tenure in order to protect tenants against this. Security of tenure, 
therefore, although clearly empowering of tenants (enabling stability of residence 
and an insurance against homelessness), was seen more as a means of protection 
against abuse than a new kind of civil right. Similarly with ‘regulated rents’ 
from 1965 onwards, the extent to which such legislation really empowered 
private tenants is questionable, except only in the sense of a protection against 
eviction (although it also conferred limited rights of succession to a tenancy). 
Since 1989, with the extension of the assured tenancy regime to all private sector 
tenancies, even this protection has been significantly reduced (for example in 
the case of shorthold tenancies where security is reduced to as little as six 
months). The result is that private tenants have now become less powerful than 
they have been at any time since 1915. 
For public sector tenants, the watershed in terms of statutory rights was the 
Housing Act 1980. That Act gave local authority and housing association tenants 
extensive rights of security of tenure, rights to sublet and take in lodgers, rights 
of succession, and rights to carry out alterations to the property, as well as the 
Right to Buy and consultation rights which have already been discussed above. 
Clearly, this constituted a significant empowering of public sector tenants who 
now became ‘secure tenants’. In practice, however, the Right to Buy has tended 
to overshadow all the other rights, with the result that empowerment has been 
seen largely in terms of the ability to exit from the tenure rather than in terms 
of increasing the freedom of manoeuvre within the tenure. Through the 1980s 
and into the 1990s, in spite of some ‘reformist’ examples, ‘radical’ approaches 
have tended to dominate, and one consequence of this has been that those 
remaining as secure tenants have not been significantly empowered by the 1980 
Act changes. 
A second major change for public sector tenants came with the Housing Act 
1988. Whereas the 1980 Act granted exclusively individual rights to tenants, the 
1988 Act introduced (albeit indirectly) a new collective right for local authority 
tenants to trigger their transfer to another landlord (the so-called Tenants’ 
Choice), and also removed the 1980 rights for new housing association tenants 
(although to some extent these rights were restored through the Housing 
Corporation’s Tenants’ Guarantee). After 1988, therefore, the paths of local 
authorities and housing associations diverged, with council tenants becoming 
more powerful and housing association tenants suffering a disempowerment 
akin to that experienced by private tenants. Council tenants made little use in 
an explicit sense of the Tenants’ Choice provisions, with a reported total of only 
981 homes in England being transferred (Bright, 1995), but the mere existence of 
the legislation may have had an empowering effect, even if in practice the rights 
under the legislation (which was finally repealed by the Housing Act 1996) were 
rarely exercised. For example, it has been said that following the publication of 
the government’s plans for Tenants’ Choice in 1987 (DoE, 1987), hitherto arrogant 
and insensitive landlords began ‘‘desperately either to placate the tenants with 
belated promises of participation and improved services, or to offload their 
housing stock completely’’ (Birchall, 1992, p. 186). In response to the Tenants’ 
Choice legislation, therefore, many local authorities sought to involve tenants 
more in the improvement of services, and such involvement inevitably carries 
with it a certain degree of empowerment. Those local authorities who aimed to 
dispose of their stock rather than improve their services also needed to ballot 
their tenants before they could proceed, and this again must have had a certain 
empowering effect on the tenants concerned. Although the extent of such 
empowerment is difficult to quantify, the key point is that as a result of the 1988 
Act local authority tenants could collectively choose whether or not to stay with 
the local authority, and this was a uniquely powerful right. In practice, very few 
tenants’ groups were ever likely to exercise such a right, not only because use of 
the Tenants’ Choice provisions was found to be extremely cumbersome and 
time-consuming, but because the vast majority of tenants’ groups probably 
prefer to sort matters out with their current landlord. Nevertheless, the choice 
not to exercise this right could be said to have been conditional upon the local 
authority’s continuing good performance or good intentions, and this indicates 
that the collective power of council tenants in relation to their landlord was 
increased. The repeal of the Tenants’ Choice provisions by the 1996 Act, therefore, 
clearly marks a significant disempowerment of council tenants. 
Since 1988 the main new right to be introduced has been the Right to Manage 
for council tenants under section 132 of the Leasehold Reform, Housing and 
Urban Development Act 1993, although in its last year of office the Conservative 
Government re-introduced a limited Right to Buy for housing association tenants. 
The Right to Manage is clearly less empowering than Tenants’ Choice, because 
it does not amount to a right to exit from local authority ownership. Nevertheless, 
until its repeal it was conceivable that the exercise of the Right to Manage by a 
tenants’ group could lead on to a Tenants’ Choice application. In any event, the 
Right to Manage appears to represent a valuable new option for those tenants 
who want more control over the housing services delivered to them and who 
want to remain as local authority tenants. In practice, however, it is difficult to 
see how a management agreement can be reached without good will and 
substantive cooperation on the landlord side, so legislation designed to support 
tenants’ groups in the face of hostile authorities seems inappropriate. As with 
the Tenants’ Choice provisions, the legislation seems to assume an adversarial 
approach, and this is an approach which few tenants’ groups would be prepared 
to risk in the face of a local authority who remains much more powerful than 
they are (even with government funding and administrative assistance). It can 
be concluded, therefore, that the effects of the Right to Manage will be negligible 
compared with the effects of exit rights (Right to Buy and Tenants’ Choice), and 
consequently the empowerment of tenants achieved by this right will be fairly 
minimal (although as with Tenants’ Choice there may be unquantified, and 
possibly unquantifiable, indirect effects in terms of changing landlord attitudes 
and culture). 
What sorts of rights apart from rights to change the tenure of one’s home 
(which are not, in any case, enjoyed by private tenants) would be really 
empowering for tenants? Probably the most relevant would be rights to require 
specific performance of an agreed standard across the whole range of landlord 
services, rights to determine the form and content of any agreement on an equal 
basis with their landlord, and rights to appropriate levels and types of resourcing 
for ‘bottom-up’ empowerment processes. Also worth mentioning, pace Birchall 
(1992, p.165), are rights to negotiation or bargaining over important decisions, 
and rights to change their relationship with their landlord by developing various 
types of joint or self-management. Some landlords have already moved in the 
directions implied by such rights, and these moves are considered below. 
Empowerment through Resourcing 
As with empowerment through knowledge, the empowerment of tenants 
through the provision of appropriate resources has been considerably facilitated 
since 1986 by legislation. Specifically, Section 16 of the Housing and Planning 
Act 1986 provided for direct government subsidy towards setting up a tenant 
management organisation (TMO). For housing association tenants, further 
funding for similar purposes has been available from the Housing Corporation 
under Section 87 of the Housing Associations Act 1985 (Dean, 1992). 
Apart from state subsidy, many landlords have provided various forms of 
assistance to tenants’ groups such as the use of local offices and office machinery 
for meetings and newsletters and the provision of training, and some have 
appointed specialist tenant participation officers with an explicit brief to encourage 
‘bottom-up’ processes of tenant empowerment. There seems little doubt that 
the resourcing of tenants’ groups is increasing, but the effects of this increase in 
resources have not yet been properly evaluated. It could be argued that for 
empowerment purposes tenants themselves ought to be able to choose how they 
are resourced. At the moment, however, the balance of resourcing is tipped in 
favour of the development of TMOs because of the bias inherent in government 
funding. 
There is another sense in which council tenants in particular have been 
disempowered, through the squeeze on local authority housing capital and 
revenue expenditure. There is some debate, however, over the extent to which 
council tenants controlled housing capital programmes and housing revenue 
accounts in the first place. Certainly, many Labour-controlled authorities in 
particular operated low-rent, low-spend policies over long periods in the belief 
that this was what tenants wanted, but hard evidence to support such beliefs is 
surprisingly lacking. In general, tenants were simply not consulted on such 
issues, and were probably not aware of the financial issues involved or of the 
resourcing choices which could be made. Now, to the extent that they are more 
consulted and better informed, they are likely to be more aware of how limited 
is the influence which they can have on key housing capital and revenue 
decisions. 
Resourcing for tenants is therefore empowering, but only if the tenants have 
some say in determining how those resources are to be used. ‘Top-down’ 
processes, however, do not tend to be very good at achieving this. What is 
mainly required are forms of mediation between landlord and tenant which will 
ensure that resources supplied from the top are applied as effectively as possible 
at the bottom. There is a need for intermediaries, such as ‘tenants’ friends’, who 
can explore different possible options with tenants and advise them accordingly. 
In practice, however, such intermediaries tend to be employed to follow an 
agenda already set by others, not by the tenants, and this agenda can be quite 
prescriptive, for example to develop tenant management organisations or to 
develop consultation arrangements only. For empowerment, what should happen 
is the tenants are assisted to de® ne their own resourcing needs and 
aspirations for themselves, and then advised as to how best to proceed on the 
basis of the resources which are likely to be available. Because this is a continuing 
requirement for tenants and not a one-off situation, there is clearly a role for 
permanent mediators, such as tenant participation officers, who should have a 
wide-ranging brief to ensure that resources are used to maximum empowerment 
effect. 
Resourcing for tenant empowerment is too important an issue to be left in the 
hands of specialist intermediaries. Housing management staff, especially in local 
offices, need to be deeply involved in order to achieve continual improvement 
in the understanding of what is practicable and realistic. Housing officers 
themselves can act as mediators between their landlord as their employer and 
their tenants as their customers, so they have a potentially significant contribution 
to make towards tenant empowerment. They too, however, need to be 
empowered in order for their contribution to be effective. At present, their skills 
and achievements go widely unrecognised within their organisations as well as 
in society more generally, and this situation has been contrasted unfavourably 
with that which exists in other countries such as Denmark (Aldbourne Associates, 
1994),where the quality of public sector housing management appears to be 
higher. The presence of better resourced and higher paid front-line staff, especially 
residential staff, could have major implications for tenant empowerment, 
if accompanied by appropriate changes in organisational culture. 
Another way of ensuring that tenants have greater control over their resourcing 
is by introducing new forms of democratic arrangement for this purpose. 
For some years, a small number of local authorities, in particular Sheffield, have 
levied an extra charge on their tenants in order to finance tenant activities and 
organisation. On the whole, however, these levies have been imposed on the 
tenants concerned ‘for their own good’, that is paternalistically, and have not 
been under the tenants’ own control. It is interesting to report, then, that the 
London Borough of Greenwich recently received support from its tenants for a 
proposal to bring the money which funds their organisations under direct 
democratic control (Inside Housing, 24.11.95). The services so funded include 
grants to tenants’ associations, support workers and a resource and information 
centre. The fund, amounting to 15p per tenant, is controlled by a committee 
representative of all tenants. Such extensions of democracy are clearly empowering 
of tenants, but they are subject to the limitations inherent in democracy 
more generally (Somerville & Steele, 1995b), and need to be supplemented by 
democratic arrangements at a more local and more accessible level. They also 
still depend for their success on the existence of appropriate forms of mediation 
at the local level (or levels) and at the organisational level. 
What about resourcing for owner occupiers? This seems a strange question to 
ask because for them their home is a crucial resource in itself. However, there 
do exist a number of agencies such as Care and Repair which are dedicated to 
helping home owners, especially those who are elderly and frail, with the 
management, maintenance and improvement of their homes. There is a large 
unmet need for such agency services to enable owner occupiers to stay put in 
their own homes. The technical, legal and financial advice available through 
such agencies could also be of value to owner occupiers more generally. 
Empowerment through Agreement and Power Transfer 
The powerful effect of legislation raises issues about how much empowerment 
can really be achieved without legislative change. The general answer is probably 
quite a lot, but without legislation the political will for empowerment tends to 
be weak or non-existent. The clearest expression of such will is through processes 
whereby a landlord attempts either to forge new partnerships with its tenants 
or to transfer specific decision-making functions to tenant bodies. The latter 
involves the creation of tenant management organisations such as tenant management 
co-operatives (TMCs) or estate management boards (EMBs). The former 
involves semi-contractual or quasi-contractual arrangements such as estate agreements 
or bilateral (or possibly multilateral) covenants (Somerville & Steele, 
1995a). 
The contribution of tenant management organisations to tenant empowerment 
has recently been evaluated for the Department of the Environment by Price 
Waterhouse (DoE, 1995). They looked at three types of TMOs, which can be 
distinguished according to the extent of decision-making responsibility transferred. First, par-value co-operatives 
(PVCs), where housing association tenants 
collectively own or lease and manage the property but have no individual 
financial stake in the equity; second, TMCs, where local authority tenants have 
taken over responsibility for some housing management functions such as repairs 
and lettings; and third, EMBs, where some housing management functions are 
delegated to a board whose majority is elected by the tenants. They found that 
the most effective TMOs were those whose members had greatest control over 
their housing management, finances and environment, that is PVCs were most 
effective, TMCs were very successful but not as effective as PVCs, and EMBs 
were least effective. Effectiveness was measured in terms of the responsiveness 
and quality of repairs, the turn round times on reletting property, and the level 
of rent arrears in relation to the cost of service provision, but also in terms of 
levels of resident satisfaction, the existence of community spirit, the extent of 
crime and vandalism, and the acquisition of skills and experience relevant 
for employment. The research therefore suggests that degree of managerial 
effectiveness (which itself has implications for tenant empowerment) may be 
related to degree of tenant empowerment through transfer of decision-making 
responsibilities. This suggestion, however, needs to be treated with some caution. 
One problem is that of the size of the management unit. Based on Swedish 
experience, it can be argued that estates with well over 1000 properties as occurs 
with many EMBs are likely to be too large for the tenants collectively to exert 
control in any meaningful sense (Somerville & Steele, 1995b). In residential areas 
of this size, the gap between board members and the bulk of residents is such 
that it cannot be said that the latter really have control over the housing in 
which they live. It is possible, therefore, that smaller EMBs, with perhaps 200 or 
so properties, which would be more empowering of residents, might also be 
more effective than larger ones, and perhaps almost as effective as TMCs. It 
cannot be definitely concluded that degree of empowerment depends upon the 
type of tenant participation arrangement, because so much hinges on the 
conditions which exist in any particular residential area, for example a higher 
level of resident involvement and strong community institutions will tend to 
lead to the formation of a co-operative but will also tend to result in more 
effective management anyway, whether a co-operative is formed or not. For this 
reason alone, a better management performance from co-operatives is only to be 
expected. 
There is a degree of complexity here, which is only beginning to be explored. 
The typologies developed earlier in this paper can help to unravel this complexity. 
To some extent, for example, it results from ‘top-down’ processes of power 
delegation and decentralisation meeting ‘bottom-up’ processes of tenant organisation, 
assertiveness and communal action. The situation is inherently dynamic 
and volatile, and the outcomes at present are difficult to predict. Naturally, the 
increasing range of options being made available to tenants makes outcomes 
increasingly unpredictable. Nevertheless, outcomes can be classified in terms of 
their ‘conservative’, ‘reforming’ or ‘radical’ character, and to this extent the 
processes themselves can be understood. For example, TMCs will be more 
‘radical’ than EMBs only insofar as they involve the transfer of more decisionmaking 
functions. In practice, however, the transfer of functions tends to be 
similar in both types of arrangement, so in similar-sized TMC and EMBs the 
degree of ‘top-down’ tenant empowerment achieved should be similar. If this 
argument is correct, then the greater level of tenant empowerment observed in 
TMCs can be attributed to ‘bottom-up’ processes, that is it has been achieved by 
the tenants’ own collective efforts and organisation. 
To take another example, par-value co-ops (PVCs) are more ‘radical’ than 
TMCs because they involve a transfer of ownership, not just of management. As 
has already been noted in relation to the Right to Buy, transfer of ownership is 
a particularly radical measure, which leads to a qualitatively new level of 
empowerment. It is to be expected, therefore, that, other things being equal, 
PVCs are likely to be more effective than TMCs, and the Price Waterhouse 
research confirms this. 
Support for the above argument can be found in the theoretical and empirical 
literature on corporatism and on implementation theory. Lewis (1990), for 
example, argues that ‘‘effective action by organisations . . . requires learning 
capacity’’ (p. 80), that is the ability to acquire skills on a collective basis which 
will ensure that the organisations achieve their objectives. From this point of 
view, new policy initiatives such as statutory rights or decentralisation represent 
opportunities of varying extents for organisations such as tenants’ groups to 
broaden and deepen their knowledge and skills. Taking advantage of such 
opportunities can then result in their empowerment, and the degree of such 
empowerment will tend to reflect the size of opportunity offered. In a similar 
vein, Simmie (1990) has argued that consumer-oriented groups at local level can 
indeed be effective if they have the necessary resources, education, political skills, 
and sheer persistence. Simmie also points out that sympathetic organisations at 
central government level can also make a huge difference (Simmie, 1990, p. 194). 
The general conclusion to be drawn from the literature is that the outcomes of 
the interaction between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ processes will depend 
primarily on how the interaction is mediated, and this is the subject of a separate 
paper (Somerville & Steele, 1996). 
In general, the transfer of power to TMOs, whether they be PVCs, TMCs or 
EMBs, represents a radical approach to tenant empowerment. Potentially, this 
approach is highly effective, but it suffers from unpredictability, and tends to 
‘lock’ tenants into one particular type of tenant participation arrangement, with 
little freedom to change to a different type if they so wish. Moreover, there is a 
widespread reluctance among tenants generally to take on the burdens of 
management responsibility. For these reasons, freely negotiated agreements 
between landlords and tenants’ groups have been suggested as an alternative. 
Such agreements represent a less radical approach to tenant empowerment, but 
there is a greater potential for the landlord’s power to be used to support tenants 
rather than leaving them to fend for themselves as can happen with the more 
radical approaches. The main point, however, is that tenants should be able to 
choose freely whether to move closer to or further away from their landlord, 
whether to be more (inter)dependent or more independent. Empowerment does 
not necessarily involve following the ‘radical’ path, but being in a position 
genuinely to decide whether to follow the ‘radical’ path or not. At present, most 
tenants are not in such a position because they are not aware of the choices 
involved and their landlords are not committed to giving them such freedom. 
The potential for new forms of partnership between landlords and their 
tenants, involving increasing interdependence, is enormous but relatively unexplored. 
We are, after all, only just beginning to understand the empowerment 
which can be produced through the operation of interorganisational and policy 
networks (Elander, 1995; Reid, 1995; Reid & Iqbal, 1995). For the time being, 
therefore, we have to rely on small-scale research such as that into estate 
agreements in England (Steele et al., 1995) and bilateral covenants in the 
Netherlands (Pott & Smeets, 1994). Such research indicates that landlords are as 
likely to be committed to partnerships with their tenants as they are to following 
more radical approaches, that is only in exceptional cases. Even some of the few 
landlords who have actually developed estate agreements do not see them as 
particularly empowering of tenants, but only as a means towards more effective 
consultation and more structured and purposeful performance organisation and 
monitoring. 
An estate agreement empowers tenants primarily through ensuring the 
accountability of their landlord. The agreement specifies estate priorities and 
performance targets for the coming year, and the landlord’s activities can then 
be evaluated against these priorities and targets. The empowerment is limited 
because there is no right of redress or right to compensation in the event of 
landlord default on the terms of the agreement, but such rights could be 
developed in time. Also, in the absence of a budget dedicated to the estate, the 
tenants have little real financial control, but again estate budgeting could be 
developed if there were the political will to do so. Overall, with a few notable 
exceptions such as Camden, Manchester and York, there is some doubt as to 
whether landlords are seriously committed to empowering their tenants through 
forms of partnership such as estate agreements. Such a conclusion prompts the 
question of whether perhaps landlords should be compelled by legislation to 
develop such agreements, but such legislation would be open to the same 
criticisms as those levelled against the Right to Manage, namely the tenants 
depend for their empowerment upon their landlord’s co-operation, and compulsion 
would have, and in some cases does have, precisely the opposite effect. 
What is needed instead is more extensive and substantial support for tenant 
organisation and education, and not just in the public sector either. 
In general, returning to the debates from the early part of this paper, it can be 
said that rights of exit and voice are empowering partly, or even mainly, because 
they promote the transfer of power to those on whom the rights are conferred. 
For tenants, however, such rights need to be supplemented by willingness on 
the part of their landlords to work together with them on a more equal basis 
and to provide them with the information they require in order to make free 
and rational choices. Finally, in order to ensure that the transfer of power is not 
monopolised by an elite group of tenants, it is important that appropriate 
arrangements are made for democratic tenant representation and for the diffusion 
of the transferred power to all minorities within the tenant body. 
Evaluation of the Empowerment Typology 
The consideration of the evidence on resident participation in the previous 
section enables a preliminary assessment to be made of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the model outlined in the third section. In this section, therefore, 
each classificatory criterion is briefly examined in turn, and a verdict is passed 
on the typology overall. 
Direction of action. The classification of empowerment processes in terms of the 
direction of empowerment action (either from the top downwards or from the 
bottom upwards) has been found to be particularly useful for making sense of a 
variety of activities affecting landlord-tenant relations, especially in relation to 
legislation and the uses to which legislation has been put, and also in relation to 
arrangements made for power transfer and power sharing between landlord and 
tenants. However, the patterns of interaction between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottomup’ 
processes remain substantially unclear, and require further investigation in a 
variety of contexts in order for the utility of the model to be fully demonstrated. 
Institutional change. The distinction between ‘conservative’, ‘radical’ and 
‘reformist’ empowerment has been found to be useful for making sense of policy 
processes at national and local levels. ‘Conservative’ processes leave the current 
balance of power relations essentially unchanged, ‘reformist’ processes retain 
the core power relationship (in this case, the landlord-tenant relation) but tend 
to place that relationship on a more equal basis, while ‘radical’ processes involve 
a decisive break from the core power relationship. As with the criterion of 
direction of action, however, this classification may turn out to be too crude to 
do justice to the complexity of institutional change wrought by empowerment 
processes. For example, ‘conservative’ processes are in fact compatible with 
substantial changes in the nature of power relations in a specific social context 
(for example, local government reorganisation or departmental restructuring). 
The balance of power between landlord and tenant may remain the same even 
though the character of the landlord (and perhaps also of the tenants) has 
changed drastically. Or again, the process may be substantially empowering of 
tenants, but it may be empowering of landlords also to the same degree, so that 
the overall balance of power is unaffected. 
Dependency effect. This criterion has been found to be less useful than those of 
direction of action and institutional change. Nevertheless, from the residents’ 
point of view, it is important to distinguish between those processes which will 
tend to increase their dependence upon landlords, local authorities and other 
sources of power, and those which will tend to give them more freedom of 
manoeuvre in relation to these ‘powers-that-be’. Admittedly, however, this is not 
a distinction which is always easy to draw in practice. Perhaps the key development 
required here is the education and resourcing of the residents concerned, 
so that they are aware of all the implications and can decide for themselves the 
degree of dependence or independence which is most suitable for them. 
Beneficiaries. In relation to formal legal and political processes in particular, it 
has been found important to ask who are the main beneficiaries. For example, 
the distinction between individual and collective rights conferred by legislation 
has been argued to be a useful one (Birchall, 1992, p. 165), and the issue has also 
been raised as to whether certain arrangements empower residents as a whole, 
or only small (elected or unelected) cliques. It has not been established, however, 
whether different types of beneficiary are actually produced by characteristic 
types of empowerment process. For example, is there a particular way of policymaking 
and implementation which is more likely to bene® t the great mass of 
residents rather than a privileged few? Answering such a question should lead 
into a more complex and detailed discussion of the mechanisms and style of 
empowerment in specific local contexts. Again, we would expect the education 
and resourcing of residents to figure prominently in such discussion. 
Overall, therefore, the typology has been demonstrated to have a certain utility, 
but it is relatively undeveloped. Further research is required to test certain elements 
of it, and to fine-tune much of the provisional classification. It could be 
argued that it has potential, but much needs to be done in order to realise this 
potential, and in the meantime the typology looks vulnerable to criticism. 
Conclusion: The Empowerment of Communities 
This paper has been largely, though not exclusively, concerned with the empowerment 
of tenant collectives. Typologies of empowerment processes have 
been developed, and means of empowerment such as information, legislation, 
resources and transfer of functions have been considered and evaluated in the 
light of these typologies. The argument in the paper has a number of implications 
for community development and the changing role of housing management, 
which are perhaps worth looking at more closely. 
First of all, by whatever means the empowerment takes place, the key question 
is whether it helps to place residents in a position where they can choose their 
own way forward: following a ‘radical’, ‘egalitarian’ or ‘conservative’ path, 
becoming more independent or more interdependent, and selecting for themselves 
their own participation arrangement and their own individual level of 
participation within that arrangement. They therefore need knowledge and skills 
in order to make an informed choice, rights to secure access to such knowledge 
and skills and to redress any unequal balance of power between landlord and 
tenant (for example, rights to switch tenure, rights to resourcing, rights to 
minimum service standards, and rights to negotiate with the landlord), control 
over an appropriate level of resources for their own organisation, and suitable 
agreements with any landlords or other service providers operating in their area 
concerning management and other matters affecting the area. 
As noted in particular in relation to the research for the DoE on TMOs, the 
empowerment of residents is worth pursuing not only for its own sake, but for 
the benefits which it can bring for community health and safety and well-being. 
As mentioned at the beginning of the paper, in practice there may not be any 
clear dividing line between housing and non-housing aspects of residential 
empowerment. Consequently, there is a need for intermediaries such as ‘tenants’ 
friends’, tenant participation officers, and local housing officers, to be more 
‘generic’ in their skills and knowledge, in order to be more effective in the 
mediation of such empowerment. This does not mean that their role should be 
merged with that of community workers (Smith, 1992), but only that the 
community dimension of housing work needs to be more widely recognised, 
and the importance of housing work for community development more widely 
appreciated. Local housing offices can provide foci for community-building 
and community-sustaining activities (Power, 1984), and the estate-based multiagency 
collaboration which results can lead to the establishment of ‘community 
institutions’ (Foster & Hope, 1993, p. 14) such as parent-and-toddler groups, preschool 
playgroups, youth clubs, and so on. The empowerment of residents by 
whatever means will tend to encourage a wider empowerment of the communities 
in which those residents live, given the existence of appropriate forms of 
institutional mediation (and what is appropriate will depend upon a number of 
factors, not least the type of participation arrangement chosen by the residents). 
In this way, most housing and social problems are actually capable of satisfactory 
solution, although more than empowerment is required to achieve this. What is 
needed in addition, and which is sadly lacking in contemporary Britain, is the 
political will at national and at local level. 
The emphasis in this paper on the empowerment of tenant collectives should 
not be taken to imply that the empowerment of tenants is more important than 
the empowerment of owner occupiers. Rather, it reflects the greater volume of 
literature concerning tenant involvement as well as the fact that ownership itself 
represents a significant level of empowerment. This should perhaps not be 
overstated in view of the perennially expressed concern for so-called ‘marginal’ 
home owners (for the most recent evidence on this, see Kempson, 1994), but 
nevertheless the bulk of evidence suggests that disempowerment for owner 
occupiers arises primarily from lack of income or stable employment and from 
the vicissitudes of the housing market. Such problems need to be tackled through 
economic, employment and fiscal policy, and perhaps new forms of housing 
market regulation, but a discussion of such measures is beyond the scope of 
this paper. There is an important issue here, because, as Harrison (1995) has 
emphasised, empowerment should not be seen as applying only to the disadvantaged 
(or socially excluded or whatever) but to all of us who find ourselves 
outside the ruling elites of capitalist society. 
A rather different point concerns the implications of the arguments in this 
paper for the theoretical debate on tenant participation and for future research 
in this area. In Somerville & Steele (1995a), a typology of institutional arrangements 
for tenant participation was presented, and each type of arrangement was 
assessed in terms of its potential for changing the balance of power between 
landlord and tenant. This typology must now be reviewed in the light of the 
arguments in this paper relating to different modes of institutional change 
(conservative, reformist, or radical). Specifically, the distinction made in the 
earlier paper between low, medium and high degrees of change in the balance 
of power now appears too crude, and should therefore be replaced by the (only 
slightly less crude) conservative/reformist/radical trio. The effect of this change 
for the different types of institutional arrangement is summarised in Table 2. 
Table 2. Types of empowerment produced by different 
types of tenant participation arrangement 
Type of arrangement Type of empowerment 
Internal market (e.g. CCT) Conservative 
Landlord-tenant partnerships Reformist 
Tenant-controlled management Radical 
Drawing all these points together, the following important conclusions can be 
made: 
· Residents can be empowered most radically by conferring on them specific 
rights to make decisions over their own lives, and by specific transfers of 
ownership, control and resources. These changes, however, should be seen 
not so much as empowering in themselves as presenting opportunities for 
residents to achieve empowerment for themselves. Strictly speaking, empowerment 
is not to be equated with owning or controlling or managing as such, 
but rather with the gaining of the freedom to choose whether to own or not 
to own, to control or not to control, to manage or not to manage. Such freedom 
of choice comes only with the acquisition of relevant knowledge and skills, in 
addition to appropriate statutory rights and redistribution arrangements. 
· By and large, politicians at national and local levels are not primarily interested 
in resident empowerment, and tend to follow their own, quite separate, 
agendas. For example, the Conservative government tended to empower 
tenants only with a view to weakening local authorities (Somerville & Steele, 
1996), while local authorities themselves have generally wanted to retain their 
monopoly position and avoid any form of power sharing with resident groups. 
All too often, national and local policy has tended to favour the cultivation of 
an elite of well-informed, skilled residents, who will act on behalf of all 
the other inhabitants of an area. This is, however, precisely the model of 
representative democracy which gives rise to the problem of disempowerment 
in the first place. The irony is that it is only the elites at national and local 
level who do not need empowerment, so the creation of yet more elites (albeit 
at lower levels) cannot possibly bring about a solution to the disempowerment 
problem. What is required instead is more broadly based and more inclusive 
education and training for empowerment, with more effective systems for 
delivering accountability and democratic control. 
· Improved systems for promoting empowerment at local level can be facilitated 
through appropriate forms of mediation. For example, tenant participation 
officers and housing estate officers could well be capable of mediating the 
resourcing of tenants in such a way as to empower the recipients. For this to 
work, however, the officers themselves would need to be empowered, and 
once again the political elites are not willing to do this. 
· Democratic control of resourcing by tenants themselves represents a significant 
level of empowerment. In practice, however, national and local politicians 
have been reluctant to allow transfer of ownership to democratically-run 
tenant bodies (Thamesmead and Walterton & Elgin Community Homes are 
the only major examples of such transfers in England, and both occurred in 
exceptional circumstances). This situation may change, however, following 
the Government’s decision to allow tenant-controlled local housing companies. 
· The creation of effective systems for empowerment at local level has implications 
going way beyond the considerations of housing policy. In a separate 
paper (Somerville & Steele, 1996), I have argued that ‘‘in certain circumstances 
residence can form the basis for a more holistic mediation of social interaction’’. 
For example, local housing offices could operate as ‘one-stop shops’ for all 
services to the local area, and these offices could be controlled by tenant majority 
boards, or could be run by partnerships between tenants and their 
landlord. Essentially, tenants’ groups could work together with local housing 
management to agree on social priorities for the area and ways in which these 
priorities could be translated into action on the ground. By this means, the 
focus on housing issues could be extended to cover economic and social issues 
more generally. 
· To some extent the typology can be used to explain differences in the 
effectiveness of different power transfer arrangements. For example, transfers 
of ownership tend to be more effective or more empowering because they 
involve ‘radical’ institutional change and increasing independence for residents, 
and typically bene® t the resident body as a whole. In contrast, transfers 
of management, for example, are less ‘radical’, they may be more beneficial 
only for certain sections of the tenant body, and the tenants are liable to 
continuing dependence on the landlord as property owner. This conclusion, 
however, should not be allowed to detract from the point made above that 
the crucial issue for empowerment concerns the degree of freedom which 
residents can exercise in relation to whether or not to enter into any particular 
power transfer arrangement. 
· One implication of the different possible and intended outcomes of empowerment 
processes is that the politics of residence and community must be 
irreducibly different from politics as traditionally understood. The most stark 
illustration of this is that empowering processes which are described as 
‘conservative’ in the sense of making no substantial institutional change can 
actually be more empowering than ‘radical’ processes which alter completely 
the nature of current institutional arrangements. For example, a local authority 
which delivers a high quality of service to its tenants will tend to be more 
empowering of those tenants than one which transfers its management or 
housing stock to its tenants and simply leaves them to get on with it. On 
reflection, however, this situation is perhaps not so far removed from a 
national politics where a working-class movement attempts to ‘conserve’ what 
little power it has in the face of ‘radical’ Tory onslaughts designed to undermine 
its very existence. In both cases, what is at issue is the defence, and if 
possible enhancement, of the power bases of ordinary people (that is, those 
who find themselves outside the national and local decision-making circles). 
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